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Organizations use penalty contracts to deter negative behavior, but these contracts are rarely used 
for subordinate performance, even though they can provide a positive motivating effect. Prior 
studies focus on subordinates’ reactions to contract frame to address this paucity of penalty 
contracts. We examine how subordinates’ contract frame affects superiors’ behavior, specifically 
their target-setting decisions, and whether a penalty contract increases superiors’ leniency, which 
could provide a potential explanation for the lack of performance penalty contracts in practice. 
Using an experiment, we predict and find that superiors’ set more lenient targets for subordinates 
under a penalty contract compared to a bonus contract, as superiors can project their negative 
perceptions of penalties onto subordinates and seek to mitigate these perceptions. This finding 
provides insight into the limited use of penalty contracts in practice, despite the positive effect 
that penalty contracts have on effort. Further, we find that increasing the salience of 
subordinates’ contract choice to the superior mitigates leniency under a penalty contract, which 
could increase the appeal of penalty contracts in practice. We also find that these effects are 
present only in low Dark Triad superiors, as high Dark Triad superiors set similar targets 
regardless of subordinates’ contract frame and choice. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Organizations utilize penalty contracts to deter specific and observable negative 
behaviors. For example, Dell and Scott’s Miracle-Gro impose employee penalties for unhealthy 
behavior, Target penalizes suppliers for late deliveries and inaccurate product information, and 
other firms penalize employees for tardiness (Pearson and Lieber 2009; Al Shaiba 2015; Vitasek 
2016). However, penalty contracts are rarely used for subordinates’ performance despite research 
findings that subordinates work harder under penalty contracts, even though they prefer bonus 
contracts (Luft 1994; Hannan, Hoffman, and Moser 2005; Church, Libby, and Zhang 2008; 
Hossain and List 2012). The lack of penalty contracts in practice presents a curious disconnect 
between the observed benefits of these contracts and the low propensity to use such contracts for 
subordinate performance. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on subordinates’ reactions to 
penalty contracts to evaluate this disconnect (e.g., Luft 1994; Imas, Sadoff, and Samek 2016; 
Gonzalez, Hoffman, and Moser 2017; de Quidt 2018). There is limited research on the way 
superiors react to their subordinates’ contract frame, and whether superiors’ behavior might 
explain the paucity of penalty contracts for subordinate performance. This study examines how 
subordinates’ contract frame affects superiors’ decisions concerning their subordinates and 
whether a penalty contract leads to increased leniency from superiors. We further evaluate a 
potential mechanism to mitigate this leniency. 
We focus on examining superior leniency toward subordinates in a target-setting context. 
Target setting influences forecasting, planning, resource allocation, risk-taking, and motivation, 
and targets are used to communicate management expectations (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; 
Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008; Bol et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2018). Further, executives 
view targets as vital for organizational success (Feichter, Grabner, and Moers 2018). As such, 
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any bias in the target-setting process can have far-reaching implications for an organization. 
Increased leniency in target setting induced by a penalty contract frame could provide an 
explanation for the lack of penalty contracts for subordinate performance within organizations, 
as leniency can adversely affect subordinate motivation and overall firm performance (Moers 
2005; Bol 2008, 2011; Nair 2017). In addition, biased targets reduce the effectiveness of 
planning and resource allocation activities that use targets as inputs. Thus, we examine whether 
superiors set more lenient targets when their subordinates work under a penalty rather than a 
bonus contract. 
 Prior research on contract frame finds that a penalty frame leads to lower non-monetary 
payoffs, elicits loss aversion, and negatively affects perceptions of fairness and trust within an 
organization (Luft 1994; Hannan et al. 2005; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012; Christ 2013). 
Superiors usually function (or have functioned) as subordinates, so they are subject to similar 
concerns and perceptions about penalty framing in their own compensation. Following Social 
Projection Theory and the false consensus effect (Marks and Miller 1987; Krueger 1998, 2000; 
Luft, Shields, and Thomas 2016), superiors are likely to project their aversion to penalty 
contracts onto their subordinates and seek to mitigate subordinates’ disutility from the penalty 
contract imposed by the organization. Thus, we predict that superiors seek to mitigate the 
perceived negative effects of penalty contracts through leniency in target setting. 
We also examine whether increasing the salience of subordinates’ choice to work under a 
particular contract mitigates superior leniency under a penalty contract. Gonzalez et al. (2017) 
find that choice removes the effort effect of penalty contracts for subordinates. Likewise, making 




Superiors concerned with motivating subordinates’ effort consider several aspects in their 
decision making concerning their subordinates, such as signaling promotability, building a 
reputation as a skilled leader, retaining good employees, avoiding damage to personal 
relationships, and limiting confrontation (Harris 1994; Bol 2011; Woods 2012). Making it salient 
to the superior that the subordinate has chosen the contract signals the subordinate’s contract 
preference. Thus, subordinates choosing a penalty contract lessens superiors’ concerns about the 
negative effects of enforcing the penalty and reduces superiors’ tendency to rely on leniency to 
offset the negative perceptions of the penalty contract. Therefore, we predict that the salience of 
subordinates’ contract choice to the superior moderates the effect of contract frame on superiors’ 
target setting, such that leniency under a penalty contract is lessened when superiors are aware 
that their subordinates chose to work under a penalty contract.1 
Lastly, we examine whether the aggressive tendencies that accompany Dark Triad 
personality traits (Paulhus and Williams 2002; Jonason, Slomski, and Partyka 2012; Majors 
2015; Martin and Thomas 2018) influence the effects of contract frame and the salience of 
subordinates' choice of contract on superiors’ target-setting decisions. As our study evaluates 
leniency in target setting (or less aggressiveness), variability in these traits, and the 
corresponding effects, is relevant to target setting under different contract frames. Further, prior 
research shows that Dark Triad traits are related to a focus on short-term relationships and a lack 
of regard for long-term consequences, as well as selfishness, emotional coldness, and an 
indifference to others (Paulhus and Williams 2002; Judge, Piccolo, and Kosalka 2009; Majors 
2015; Young, Dworkis, and Olsen 2015). We argue, that as high Dark Triad superiors are less 
                                                 
1 There are many factors that can affect individuals’ career choices. We do not argue that contract frame is the only 
factor that influences the decision to accept or decline a job offer. We simply make the bonus/penalty factor the 
most salient to the superior during the target-setting process as a potential way to reduce bias in the target. 
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empathetic to others and their circumstances compared to low Dark Triad superiors, high Dark 
Triad superiors will be less likely to consider how contract frame and choice affect their 
subordinates and less likely to feel the need to mitigate any negative perceptions of penalty 
contracts for their subordinates. Thus, we predict that subordinates’ contract frame and choice 
will have less of an effect on the targets set by high Dark Triad superiors compared to low Dark 
Triad superiors. 
We test our hypotheses using a 2 (Bonus/Penalty) x 2 (Choice/No Choice) between-
participants experimental design with measured personality traits administered via Qualtrics. Our 
participants are business school alumni who have considerable experience in supervisory roles 
and target setting. In the experiment, participants act as superiors tasked with setting a target for 
a subordinate. The subordinate is subject to either a bonus or penalty contract, which are 
economically equivalent, and a portion of the participants are made aware that their subordinate 
chose to work at the current company under the given contract frame (either bonus or penalty) 
instead of a different company with the opposing contract frame. 
We find that superiors set more lenient targets when their subordinates operate under a 
penalty contract as compared to a bonus contract. However, this leniency bias is mitigated if 
superiors are aware that subordinates chose their type of contract, such that targets are similar 
between bonus and penalty contracts. Lastly, we find that the Dark Triad traits significantly 
influence the interactive effect of subordinate contract frame and choice on superiors' target-
setting. In line with our main findings, low Dark Triad superiors set more lenient targets under 
penalty contracts compared to bonus contracts when their subordinates’ choice of contract is not 
salient, but set similar targets between penalty and bonus contracts when their subordinates’ 
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choice of contract is salient. Conversely, subordinate contract frame and choice do not affect the 
targets set by high Dark Triad superiors. 
We contribute to the accounting literature in three ways. First, we extend prior literature 
on contract frame and target setting by demonstrating that subordinates’ contract frame affects 
the targets superiors set for their subordinates. We find that superiors empathize with their 
subordinates facing a penalty contract by setting lower targets compared to a bonus contract, 
which lowers the probability that the subordinates will be subject to the penalty. Thus, we 
document that subordinate contract frame is an additional factor that influences target-setting 
decisions. Showing that penalty contracts lead to leniency in targets, provides a potential reason 
for the paucity of penalty contracts for subordinate performance in practice. 
Second, we introduce a mechanism to reduce target-setting leniency bias under penalty 
contracts. We show that when subordinates’ contract choice is made salient to superiors, 
superiors are no longer lenient in their target setting under a penalty contract compared to a 
bonus contract. Specifically, we find that targets are similar between bonus and penalty contracts 
when the superior is aware that the subordinate self-selected into their contract. This finding 
suggests that reminding superiors that subordinates chose to work under the given contract could 
mitigate the tendency to set lower targets under penalty contracts and, potentially, make penalty 
contracts more acceptable in practice. 
Third, we add to the understanding of how individual characteristics, specifically the 
Dark Triad personality traits, influence reactions to compensation design. Individuals high in 
Dark Triad traits are generally less empathetic to others, and thus, high Dark Triad superiors are 
less likely to attempt to mitigate the negative effects of penalty contracts for their subordinates. 
We show that subordinates’ contract frame and choice influence low Dark Triad superiors, such 
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that they set more lenient targets under a penalty contract when their subordinates’ choice of 
contracts is not salient, but set similar targets between penalty and bonus contracts when 
subordinates’ choice of contract is salient. As hypothesized, however, these factors do not 
influence the targets set by high Dark Triad superiors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews prior literature and 
develops the hypotheses, section III explains the experimental design, section IV discusses the 
results, and section V concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Penalty contracts motivate subordinates to exert greater effort than do bonus contracts 
(Luft 1994, Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Hossain and List 2012), but, despite this 
benefit, they are uncommon in practice. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on 
subordinates’ reactions to penalty contracts to evaluate the disconnect between the positive 
effect that penalty contracts have on subordinate effort and the lack of these contracts for 
subordinate performance in practice (Luft 1994; Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Christ et 
al. 2012; Hossain and List 2012). There is limited research as to how superiors react to their 
subordinates’ contract frame, and whether superiors’ behavior might contribute to the paucity of 
penalty contracts for subordinate performance. This study addresses this paucity by examining 
how subordinates’ contract frame affects superiors’ target-setting decisions for their 
subordinates, and whether a penalty contract increases superiors’ leniency in target setting. 
Increased leniency provides an explanation for the lack of subordinate-performance penalty 
contracts within organizations, as leniency can adversely affect overall firm performance through 
lower subordinate motivation and less efficient planning, resource allocation, and other activities 
that rely on targets as inputs (Moers 2005; Bol 2008, 2011; Nair 2017).  
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Contract Frame: Bonus vs. Penalty Contracts 
Classical economic models do not differentiate between bonus and penalty framing, 
given that the total expected pay is the same, as these models assume that framing will not 
influence behavior (e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988). However, framing has been shown to 
have widespread effects on decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Levin, Schneider, 
and Gaeth 1998; Cornelissen and Werner 2014). In evaluating contract frame, prior research 
provides insight into why effort is higher under penalty contracts compared to bonus contracts 
and identifies three reasons why individuals prefer bonus contracts over penalty contract. 
First, individuals prefer bonus contracts over penalty contracts as penalty contracts 
present possible losses. Individuals are generally loss averse, experiencing greater disutility from 
a loss than utility from a gain of equal magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Loss aversion 
implies that compensation that includes a potential bonus will be perceived as more valuable 
than compensation of economic equivalence that includes a potential penalty. Luft (1994) and 
Hannan et al. (2005) argue that loss aversion is the primary explanation for higher effort 
observed in penalty contracts. The loss aversion associated with penalty contracts leads 
subordinates to exert greater effort under penalty compared to bonus contracts, as losses loom 
larger than gains (Luft 1994, Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Hossain and List 2012). 
Thus, prior research shows that, even though individuals prefer bonus to penalty contracts, they 
exert greater effort under penalty contracts due to loss aversion. The increased effort under a 
penalty contract leads to a conundrum, in that firms would benefit from the increased effort, but 
these contracts are quite limited for subordinate performance in practice. 
Second, a contract framed in terms of a bonus leads to higher non-monetary utility 
compared to an identical contract framed in terms of a penalty (Luft 1994). A bonus has a 
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positive connotation of achievement, approval, and reward, providing positive non-monetary 
utility when earned, but avoiding a penalty does not induce the same positive effect. Conversely, 
being subject to a penalty feels condemning, leading to disutility, while failing to earn a bonus 
has less of a negative connotation. Thus, individuals can derive non-monetary positive utility 
from bonus contracts and negative non-monetary utility from a penalty contract. 
Third, contract frame affects perceptions of fairness and trust between superiors and 
subordinates (Christ et al. 2012). Building on prior studies examining the effects of contract 
frame on subordinate effort in a complete contract setting, Christ et al. (2012) study the 
mechanisms behind the effect of superiors’ choice to implement a given contract on subordinate 
effort in an incomplete contract setting.2 An incomplete contract setting introduces superiors’ 
discretion over bonus allocation or penalty adjustments, as some aspects of the superior-
subordinate relationship cannot be ex-ante incorporated into a contract. The authors argue that, in 
such settings, subordinates’ trust in their superiors is an important consideration in subordinates’ 
decisions to exert effort, with greater trust leading to more effort. Their findings indicate that the 
implementation of a bonus contract leads to greater trust, whereas the implementation of a 
penalty contract prompts distrust. Thus, prior research documents a strong subordinate 
preference for bonus contracts due to loss aversion, non-monetary utility, and trust effects. 
We posit there are two reasons why subordinates’ contract frame influences superiors’ 
leniency towards their subordinates. First, as superiors have usually functioned as subordinates 
and are subject to similar concerns about their own compensation, they likely have a more 
favorable disposition toward bonus contracts due to the associated non-monetary benefits and a 
                                                 
2 Christ et al. (2012) examine the effect of the superior’s choice to implement a certain contract, whereas, we 




more negative disposition toward penalty contracts due to loss aversion, the negative connotation 
of penalties, and perceptions of lower fairness and trust. Social Projection Theory and the false 
consensus effect maintain that individuals expect others to think and act similar to themselves 
and, thus, underestimate differences between their own and others’ beliefs or preferences (Marks 
and Miller 1987; Krueger 1998, 2000; Luft et al. 2016). Hence, superiors can project their beliefs 
concerning contract preferences and any potential responses to contract frame upon their 
subordinates, thus assuming that their subordinates also prefer bonus contracts and experience 
disutility from penalty contracts. Superiors that have negative perceptions of penalty contracts 
and project these perceptions onto their subordinates can seek to mitigate these perceived 
negative effects through leniency in their decisions concerning their subordinates. This is 
consistent with prior research showing that superiors set lower targets for their subordinates to 
mitigate concerns about fairness (Bol et al. 2010). 
Second, superiors consider several factors other than subordinate motivation in their 
compensation decisions, such as building a reputation as a skilled leader, retaining good 
employees, preventing damage to personal relationships, and avoiding confrontation (Harris 
1994; Bol 2011; Woods 2012). Further, superiors have an incentive to preserve the trust 
environment and avoid actions that can be interpreted by subordinates as signals of mistrust 
(Christ et al. 2012). Thus, superiors can be reluctant to enforce a penalty, compared to provide a 
bonus, as the enforcement of a penalty is likely to lower trust and retention and increase 
confrontation costs and damage to personal relationships. 
In our study, we examine superiors’ leniency in their target-setting decisions. Targets 
communicate superiors’ expectations and can affect resource allocation, organizational planning, 
risk-taking, financial reporting, and motivation (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Sprinkle et al. 
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2008; Bol et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2018). As such, target setting plays a vital role in the 
management control system and can significantly influence organizational success (Feichter et 
al. 2018). Any bias in the target-setting process reduces the accuracy of activities that rely on 
targets as inputs, such as organizational planning and resource allocation decisions. 
Hence, we argue that superiors will be more lenient in target setting for subordinates 
under a penalty compared to a bonus contract to offset the negative connotation of such contracts 
and lower the likelihood of penalty enforcement. This leniency can manifest in the target-setting 
process through setting lower targets ex-ante for subordinates under a penalty contract to 
increase the likelihood of achieving the targets and, thus, reduce the effect of disutility from this 
contract frame. We formalize the predicted effect in the following hypothesis: 
H1: Superiors will set lower targets for subordinates working under a penalty 
contract than they will for subordinates working under a bonus contract. 
Salience of Subordinate’s Contract Choice 
Having a choice increases intrinsic motivation and performance, and individuals value 
being able to choose their own courses of action (Langer and Rodin 1976; Iyengar and Lepper 
1999; Botti and Iyengar 2004). For example, individuals are willing to pay more for an insurance 
policy when they have a choice of policies than they are for the same insurance policy when they 
have no choice of policies (Szrek and Baron 2007). This finding indicates that individuals are 
willing to give up some of their resources to acquire a choice regardless of the available options. 
In line with this view, Gonzalez et al. (2017) show that subordinates who chose to accept either a 
penalty or bonus contract show no difference in effort between contracts, demonstrating that 
choice can potentially reduce (or nullify) the effect of contract frame on subordinates’ effort.  
Prior research in accounting and behavioral economics demonstrates that individuals 
consider and react to the choices made by counterparties (Rabin 1993; Kagel, Kim, and Moser 
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1996). More specifically, observing the choice of others increases the perceived value and utility 
of the chosen alternative to the observer (Chung et al. 2015). Thus, when subordinates’ choice to 
work under a bonus or penalty contract is salient to the superiors, they can take the subordinates’ 
choice as an indication of the value and utility of the contract to the subordinate. If superiors 
project their own preferences for a bonus contract onto the subordinate, they assume that 
subordinates value a bonus contract more than a penalty contract. Discovering that the 
subordinate chose a bonus contract confirms this assumption and, thus, has little incremental 
effect on superiors’ perceptions of the value of bonus and penalty contracts. In contrast, 
discovering that the subordinate chose a penalty contract contradicts this assumption, indicating 
that the subordinate values a penalty contract more than a bonus contract. 
Additionally, highlighting the subordinates’ choice to the superiors would make superiors 
less likely to project their beliefs concerning contract frame onto their subordinates, as 
subordinates’ choice of contracts reveals their preference for the chosen contract. Individuals 
tend to assume that others share their preferences and beliefs (Marks and Miller 1987; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Luft et al. 2016), which magnifies social projection. Learning about 
differences between oneself and others, however, greatly diminishes social projection (Robbins 
and Krueger 2005). Subordinates’ choice of penalty contract signals to superiors that 
subordinates value and experience positive utility from the penalty contract, eliminating 
superiors’ need to mitigate the negative non-monetary effects potentially created by penalty 
contracts.  
Therefore, we argue that the salience of the subordinates’ choice of contract to superiors 
negates the leniency effect of contract frame by highlighting the chosen contract as more 
valuable to subordinates and as their preference. We expect this lack of leniency to manifest by 
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superiors setting similar targets for subordinates who choose to work under a penalty contract as 
they do for those who choose to work under a bonus contract. We state the formal moderating 
hypothesis: 
H2: Making subordinates’ choice of contract salient to superiors will moderate 
the effect of contract frame on the targets set by superiors. 
Dark Triad Personality Traits 
We further analyze how superiors’ Dark Triad personality traits influence the effects of 
subordinates’ contract frame and choice on superiors’ target setting. The Dark Triad personality 
traits of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy are conceptually distinct but share a 
common core based on lack of empathy, interpersonal manipulation, and exploitation of others 
(Miller et al. 2010; Jones and Paulhus 2011; Jones and Figueredo 2013). Further, research has 
shown that these traits are relevant to decision-making, strategy, and the success of firm policies 
at varying levels throughout an organization (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Wales, Patel, 
and Lumpkin 2013; Olsen, Dworkis, and Young 2014; Majors 2015). We focus on the Dark 
Triad traits for two main reasons. First, these traits are shown to relate to aggressive behaviors 
(Paulhus and Williams 2002; Jonason et al. 2012; Majors 2015; Martin and Thomas 2018), and, 
as we evaluate leniency (or less aggressive targets), individual variability in traits related to 
aggressiveness is particularly relevant to target setting under different contract frames. Second, 
prior research links these traits to risk-seeking behavior, a focus on short term relationships, lack 
of regard for long term consequences, selfishness, emotional coldness, and lack of empathy 
(Jonason and Tost 2010; Jonason, Luevano, and Adams 2012; Stead et al. 2012; Crysel, Crosier, 
and Webster 2013; Majors 2015). These aspects of the Dark Triad traits can lessen superiors’ 
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concern about relevant relationship aspects, such as confrontation and trust, and reduce empathy 
toward subordinates and the consideration of the subordinates’ perspective. 
Our hypothesized effects of subordinate contract frame and choice on superiors’ leniency 
in target setting depend on superiors projecting their preferences onto subordinates, empathizing 
with subordinates, and mitigating the perceived negative effects of contract frame by setting 
more lenient targets. The resulting leniency depends on superiors’ ability to imagine and care 
about the perspective of their subordinates. High Dark Triad individuals, however, are self-
oriented and strive to reach their own goals without regard for others, which limits their ability to 
take the perspective of others (Jones and Paulhus 2010; Jonason et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2013; 
Giammarco and Vernon 2014; Grijalva et al. 2015). Further, these individuals can negatively 
view others as weak and emotional, which likely makes it difficult to take on and empathize with 
another’s perspective (Christie and Geis 1970; Morf and Rhodewalt 1993; Jones and Paulhus 
2010; Rauthmann and Will 2011; Rauthmann 2012; Black, Woodworth, and Porter 2014). 
This general lack of empathy can interfere with high Dark Triad individuals’ ability to 
recognize and care about another’s internal state (Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012; Brook and Kosson 
2013; Jonason and Krause 2013; Black et al. 2014; Giammarco and Vernon 2014). Hence, we 
argue that high Dark Triad superiors’ will be less likely to consider the impact of subordinates’ 
contract frame and choice on the subordinates’ behavior and perceptions of fairness and trust 
compared to low Dark Triad superiors. In turn, high Dark Triad superiors will not feel the need 
to mitigate the negative connotation of a penalty contract and will, thus, be less lenient in their 
targets for subordinates that face a penalty contract. Accordingly, we predict that subordinates’ 
contract frame and choice will have less of an effect on high Dark Triad superiors’ target setting 
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compared to low Dark Triad superiors. The above discission leads us to hypothesize the 
following interaction: 
H3: Dark Triad traits will moderate the combined effect of contract frame and 
choice on superiors’ target-setting, with less of an effect on high Dark Triad 
superiors compared to low Dark Triad superiors. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Participants 
Participants are 325 business school alumni recruited from the alumni database of 
a large Midwestern business school. The participants are 63% male and are, on average, 
50 years old. The sample of participants also has considerable organizational experience 
with 25 years of work experience, which includes 16 years of supervisory and 11 years of 
target-setting experience, on average. 
We solicit responses from a random sample of 7,000 alumni. A total of 660 
participants started the survey, and of these, 405 completed the survey in its entirety.3 To 
ensure that observations are analyzed from participants who provided sufficient focus to 
the experiment and understood our manipulations, some observations are removed before 
arriving at the final sample. First, we remove 67 participants who failed either of the two 
manipulation check questions.4 Second, we remove 11 participants who spent more than 
10 minutes on the target-setting screen, which indicates these participants were distracted 
at the critical point of the survey, as 95% of all respondents spent less than five minutes 
on this screen. Finally, we remove two participants who entered an extreme growth target 
of over 70%. These two participants might have mistyped the growth target or 
                                                 
3 There are no significant differences in dropout rate between conditions (ps > 0.14). 
4 The manipulation check questions ask, “Your line manager receives a bonus (is subject to a penalty) if he/she 
meets (does not meet) the target that you set” and “You were informed that the line manager chose to work for [this 
company] rather than another company with a different compensation plan” with answer choices as “Yes” or “No”. 
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misunderstood the instructions, as the growth goal for the organization is 8%, and the 
average growth target set is 6.87%. Thus, our final sample consists of 325 participants. 
Tasks and Procedure 
We use a 2 (Bonus/Penalty Contract) x 2 (Choice/No Choice) between-participant 
experimental design, with measured personality traits, adapted from Martin and Thomas 
(2018). We administer the study via a Qualtrics link emailed to potential participants. 
Participants assume the role of the division manager for the swimwear division of a firm 
that specializes in producing and selling designer clothing at a lower cost. Their primary 
task is to set the annual target for one of their line managers (subordinate). Participants 
are informed that they are responsible for division profit growth and that their 
compensation is dependent on whether the company achieves its profit growth target. The 
company’s goal is to grow profit by 8%, which is a significant jump from the 4% growth 
in the previous year. Their division is responsible for the production, marketing, and 
pricing strategy for swimwear, which makes up 30% of the company’s sales dollars and 
35% of the profit dollars. 
Participants read that their subordinate’s compensation is comprised of a fixed 
salary and either a potential bonus or penalty, randomly assigned. The subordinate’s total 
compensation is described as either a salary of 500 Tilas and a potential bonus of 50 
Tilas, or a salary of 550 Tilas and a potential penalty of 50 Tilas (keeping the contracts 
economically equivalent). The bonus is earned (not earned) if the subordinate beats 
(misses) the target that the participant sets, while the penalty applies (does not apply) if 
the subordinate misses (beats) the target that the participant sets. 
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We manipulate the salience of the subordinate’s choice of contract by informing 
half of the participants that the subordinate chose to work for the company under the 
bonus (penalty) contract rather than to work for another company with a penalty (bonus) 
contract, while the remaining participants do not receive this information. This 
manipulation is akin to that used in Gonzalez et al. (2017), in which the authors evaluate 
how contract choice affects subordinates’ effort. In the study, ‘firms’ offered jobs with 
either an economically equivalent bonus or penalty contract and workers had the 
opportunity to select a job, and several workers were able to choose between jobs with 
different contract frames. In our study, we make this choice between firms with different 
contract frames salient to the superior. 
Participants are then provided with information about the subordinate’s 
responsibilities and told that the subordinate achieved profit growth of 5% in the previous 
year. All participants receive further information about the subordinate’s and the 
subordinate’s peers’ past performance over the last four years, the economic forecast, the 
industry forecast, and the forecast for swimwear (shown in Appendix A).5 Participants 
are then asked to set the annual profit growth target in percentage form for their 
subordinate. They complete the experiment by answering manipulation check and post-
experimental questions, and are then provided with an opportunity to enter into a gift card 
drawing. 
At the end of the instrument, participants are informed that they will receive a link 
to a second survey within two weeks. This follow-up survey focused on personality 
                                                 
5 This additional information was selected based on past findings that these types of information are important in 
determining performance measures and setting targets (Lambert 2001; Murphy 2000; Gong, Li, and Shin 2011; 
Holzhacker, Mahlendorf, and Matejka 2013). 
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characteristics and was sent about a week after the initial survey was complete.6 After 
completing this follow-up survey, participants are provided another opportunity to enter 
to win a gift card.  
Variable Measurement 
Our primary dependent variable is the leniency of the target, captured directly by the 
level of the target that participants set (Target). Our independent variables are ContractFrame, a 
dummy variable for whether the subordinate is subject to a potential bonus (coded as 0) or 
potential penalty (coded as 1), and Choice, a dummy variable for whether it is salient that the 
subordinate had a choice of companies with differing contracts to work for or not. We measure 
participants’ level of Dark Triad traits using the Short Dark Triad Scale (SD3, shown in 
Appendix B).7 The responses are cumulated, and a median-split is used to identify participants as 
high or low Dark Triad (DarkTriad). 
IV. RESULTS 
Effect of Contract Frame (H1) 
We first examine the effect of ContractFrame on the targets set by superiors to evaluate 
whether superiors are more lenient when their subordinates work under a penalty contract 
compared to a bonus contract (H1), with descriptive statistics shown in Table 1, Panel A. We 
find that, when subordinate choice is not made salient, superiors set more lenient targets for 
subordinates under a penalty contract (6.58%) compared to a bonus contract (7.08%) (p = 0.02, 
                                                 
6 We included several personality questionnaires in the follow-up survey to reduce hypothesis guessing and 
randomized the order in which participants answered the questionnaires. The experimental task and personality 
questionnaires were sent at different times to remove potential confounding effects from completing them at the 
same time. A week delay was used to provide sufficient time to remove effects from the experiment on responses to 
the personality questionnaires. This time delay when collecting personality characteristics with an experimental task 
is in line with prior studies (e.g., Holderness, Olsen, and Thornock 2016, 2017; Martin and Thomas 2018). 
7 This short questionnaire is strongly correlated with the full instrument and is shown to have high internal 
consistency for each individual trait and an acceptable factor structure (Jones and Paulhus 2014). 
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one-tailed). Gender can play a role in aggressiveness, such that males and females vary in their 
aggressive tendencies (e.g., Björkqvist 1994), and thus, we also test the effect of ContractFrame 
on Target with Gender as a covariate (untabulated). In this model, Gender is significant (p = 
0.03, two-tailed) and ContractFrame remains significant (p = 0.01, one-tailed), again in support 
of H1. Participants are also asked the following post experimental question using a 5-point Likert 
scale: “I intentionally set a difficult target to drive higher employee performance.” The findings 
further support our hypothesis that superiors are more lenient under a penalty contract 
(Bonus/No Choice = 3.63 > Penalty/No Choice = 3.25; p = 0.02, one-tailed).  Hence, the 
evidence provides support that the type of contract that subordinates operate under influences 
superiors’ target-setting decisions concerning their subordinates, such that superiors set more 
lenient targets for subordinates under a penalty contract compared to a bonus contract.  
Effect of Contract Choice Salience (H2) 
We predict in H2 that the salience of subordinates’ contract choice to superiors will 
moderate the effect of contract frame on target setting, such that the difference in target levels set 
by superiors between bonus and penalty contracts will be mitigated when the subordinates’ 
choice is salient to superiors. Figure 1 illustrates that our results are consistent with the predicted 
interaction. To test this prediction, we run a general linear model with Target as the dependent 
variable and ContractFrame and Choice as the independent variables. As we show that Gender 
significantly affects Target, we include this variable in the model as a covariate. Table 1, Panel B 
shows that ContractFrame still has a direct effect on Target (p = 0.01, one-tailed), but that this 
effect is significantly moderated by Choice (p = 0.03, one-tailed), supporting H2.8 As noted, 
there is a significant difference in the target level set by superiors between penalty and bonus 
                                                 
8 There is no qualitative difference in inferences when Gender is excluded from the model. 
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contracts when the subordinate’s choice is not salient to the superior (6.58 < 7.08, p = 0.02, one-
tailed), but there is no difference in the targets set by superiors between contract conditions when 
the subordinate choice is salient (6.88 ≈ 6.86, p = 0.95, two-tailed). Thus, superiors are more 
lenient in their target setting under a penalty contract compared to a bonus contract, but this 
leniency is mitigated when it is salient that the subordinate had a choice of contract. Further 
analyses discussed in the next section, however, provide evidence that low Dark Triad superiors 
drive the effects related to H1 and H2. 
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here] 
Dark Triad Personality Traits 
 We predict that the superiors’ level of Dark Triad personality traits moderates the 
combined effect of subordinates’ contract frame and choice on targets set by superiors. We argue 
that these factors will have less of an effect on high Dark Triad superiors compared to low Dark 
Triad superiors, as superiors high in the Dark Triad traits are less likely to consider the effect of 
contract frame and choice from their subordinates’ perspective. To evaluate this prediction, we 
included the SD3 for Dark Triad traits in our follow-up characteristic survey. This survey was 
sent to the 325 participants that completed the initial instrument, and of these, we received 256 
sufficiently completed responses.9 For our analysis, we cumulate the responses to the SD3 and 
use a median-split to characterize participants as high and low Dark Triad superiors. Those at or 
above the median are classified as high Dark Triad, with those below the median classified as 
low Dark Triad.10 High (Low) Dark Triad participants are coded as 1 (0). Figure 2 outlines the 
frequency of the cumulated ratings for each characteristic and the combination of the Dark Triad 
                                                 
9 We continue to find support for H1 and H2 using this reduced sample. 
10 Our inferences are unchanged if we classify only those above the median as high Dark Triad, and those at or 
below the median as low Dark Triad; or if we drop those participants at the median and compare only those above 
the median (high Dark Triad) to those below the median (low Dark Triad). 
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traits, and Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of effects of subordinates’ contract frame and choice 
with low Dark Triad superiors (Panel A) and high Dark Triad superiors (Panel B).11  
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here] 
 We use the completed responses to run a general linear model with Target as the 
dependent variable and ContractFrame, Choice, and DarkTriad as the independent variables, 
shown on Table 2. We again control for Gender as it is significantly correlated with target 
leniency.12 We continue to find that ContractFrame directly affects Target (p = 0.01, one-tailed) 
and that ContractFrame and ContractChoice significantly interact to affect Target (p = 0.01, 
one-tailed). As predicted, we find that DarkTriad moderates this interaction, such that high and 
low Dark Triad superiors are affected differently by subordinates’ contract frame and choice in 
target setting (p = 0.05, one-tailed), supporting H3.13 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We also evaluate the same general linear model separately for low and high Dark Triad 
superiors, shown on Table 3. For low Dark Triad superiors (Table 3, Panel A), we find that 
ContractFrame directly affects Target (p = 0.03, two-tailed) and that ContractFrame and Choice 
significantly interact to affect Target (p = 0.02, two-tailed). On the other hand, there are no 
significant effects of ContractFrame or Choice on Target (ps > 0.40, two-tailed) for high Dark 
Triad superiors (Table 3, Panel B). Accordingly, simple effects tests, shown on Table 4, 
demonstrate that low Dark Triad superiors give more lenient targets to subordinates with a 
penalty contract, but this effect is mitigated when the subordinate’s choice is salient (Panel A). 
                                                 
11 The pattern of results verifies the findings in Martin and Thomas (2018), that high Dark Triad superiors tend to set 
lower targets than low Dark Triad superiors when they do not have ex post compensation discretion. 
12 There is no qualitative difference in inferences when Gender is excluded from the model. 
13 To test the robustness of our dichotomous DarkTriad variable, we also run a regression model using a continuous 
DarkTriad measure. In the model, we regress Target on ContractFrame, Choice, and DarkTriad, with full 
interaction of these variables. We find a significant interaction of ContractFrame, Choice, and DarkTriad (p = 0.01, 
one-tailed), further supporting H3. 
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On the other hand, subordinates’ contract frame and choice do not appear to influence the targets 
set by high Dark Triad superiors (Panel B). Thus, low Dark Triad superiors drive the tendency to 
be lenient under a penalty contract that we document in prior tests of H1, suggesting that high 
Dark Triad superiors’ target-setting decisions are not influenced by subordinate-related concerns.  
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 We further evaluate how the individual traits within the Dark Triad influence the effect of 
subordinates’ contract frame and choice on target setting. We run the same model, with 
Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy as an independent variable in place of 
DarkTriad (untabulated). We find that Machiavellianism (p = 0.09, one-tailed) and Narcissism (p 
= 0.02, one-tailed) significantly interact with ContractFrame and Choice, supporting H3. 
However, there is no significant effect of Psychopathy (p = 0.14, one-tailed). If the measures of 
Machiavellianism and Narcissism are cumulated, the combined effect also interacts with 
ContractFrame and Choice to affect Target (p = 0.05, one-tailed). Thus, our findings for the 
DarkTriad are driven mainly by superiors’ levels of Machiavellianism and narcissism. 
Supplemental Analyses 
We first explore whether superiors’ have a preference for bonus contracts as argued in 
our theoretical development. In a post-experimental question, we provide participants two 
economically equivalent contracts (bonus vs. penalty) and ask them to rate their preference 
between the contracts on a 100-point Likert scale, with zero showing full preference for the 
bonus contract and 100 showing full preference for the penalty contract. We find that the mean 
response is 22.25, which is significantly less than the midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001, two-tailed), 
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supporting our argument that superiors prefer a bonus contract and can potentially project this 
preference onto their subordinates. 
We also evaluate how subordinates’ contract frame influences superiors’ perceptions of 
penalty vs. bonus contracts and concerns about these contracts. Participants answer a series of 
post-experimental questions to assist in understanding the aspects that drive the observed target 
leniency (untabulated). Those in the penalty conditions find the target-setting process more 
difficult and stressful (ps < 0.01, two-tailed) than those in the bonus conditions. Participants in 
the penalty conditions are also more concerned about their subordinate, and their own image as 
superiors, compared to participants in the bonus conditions. Specifically, participants in the 
penalty contract conditions show more concern about hurting their relationship with the 
subordinate, avoiding confrontations with subordinates, being criticized by the subordinate, 
being perceived as fair and effective by their own superior, the outcome if the subordinate did 
not achieve the target, and their image as a target-setter (untabulated, ps ≤ 0.05, two-tailed). 
These findings support the argument that superiors perceive penalty contracts more negatively 
than bonus contracts, and can thus project these perceptions to their subordinates, leading to a 
perceived need to mitigate disutility arising from penalty contracts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In our study, we evaluate the effect of subordinates’ contract frame and choice on 
superiors’ target-setting decisions concerning their subordinates. Several studies have examined 
the effect of contract frame on subordinates’ behavior, providing evidence that subordinates have 
a strong preference for bonus contracts but tend to provide greater effort under a penalty contract 
(Luft 1994; Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Hossain and List 2012). There is a paucity of 
research, however, as to how subordinate contract frame affects superiors. 
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We find that penalty contracts lead to leniency in superiors’ decisions concerning their 
subordinates, as demonstrated by lower targets set for subordinates working under a penalty 
contract rather than a bonus contract. These findings can provide some insight as to the limited 
amount of penalty contracts used within organizations for subordinate performance, as these 
types of contracts can lead to greater leniency bias in superiors’ decisions, which reduces their 
organizational effectiveness, as targets are used for motivation, forecasting, resource allocation, 
planning, and other essential organizational functions (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Sprinkle et 
al. 2008; Bol et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2018). However, we find that superiors are no longer lenient 
when they are reminded that the subordinate self-selected into the type of contract, suggesting 
that superiors use subordinate choice to judge the value and utility that the subordinate garners 
from the contract rather than projecting their own contract preference onto their subordinate. 
This finding reveals a simple mechanism that can counteract superiors’ leniency under a penalty 
contract. If subordinates’ choice to work for the firm under a specific contract is made salient to 
superiors as they are making target-setting decisions, leniency in target setting can be mitigated, 
providing a simple and cost-effective method for firms to reap the benefits of penalty contracts 
without inducing leniency.  
It is important to note that the observed effects are concentrated in low Dark Triad 
superiors, highlighting the importance of understanding how personality characteristics influence 
the effectiveness of management control systems. Specifically, we find that low Dark Triad 
superiors are more lenient in target setting to those subordinates who operate under a penalty 
contract unless it is salient that the subordinate chose the contract. High Dark Triad superiors, on 
the other hand, are less likely to empathize with their subordinates and consider the situation 
from their subordinates’ point of view. Consistently, we find that high Dark Triad superiors are 
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not influenced by subordinates’ contract frame and choice, setting similar targets regardless of 
the type of contract the subordinate operates under and whether or not they are aware that the 
subordinate chose the contract. 
We make several contributions to the accounting literature. First, we extend prior 
literature on target setting and the effects of contract frame on subordinate behavior by 
demonstrating that subordinates’ contract frame influences superiors’ target-setting decisions. 
Understanding superiors’ perspectives can provide insight into the disconnect between the 
documented benefits of penalty contracts for subordinate performance and the lack of penalty 
contracts in practice. Superiors’ leniency in the target-setting process can potentially help explain 
this disconnect, as we provide evidence that subordinates’ penalty contracts can lead to leniency 
bias in target setting. 
Second, we introduce a way to mitigate superiors’ target-setting leniency. Making it 
salient to superiors that subordinates have chosen to work under a penalty contract mitigates the 
tendency to be lenient. Thus, firms can reap the motivational benefits of penalty contracts 
without the associated target-setting leniency bias. If superiors set targets after being reminded 
that the subordinate had a choice, target leniency should be significantly lessened. 
Third, we add to the understanding of how individual characteristics, specifically the 
Dark Triad personality traits, influence reactions to compensation design. We show that low 
Dark Triad superiors are influenced by subordinates’ contract frame and choice, such that they 
set more lenient targets with a penalty contract without subordinate choice but set similar targets 
between penalty and bonus contracts when the subordinates’ choice of contract is salient. 
However, these factors do not significantly influence the targets set by high Dark Triad 
superiors. As organizations are made up of individuals, it is important to understand how their 
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behaviors and characteristics affect organizational decision making (Kachelmeier 2010), and our 
findings highlight the importance of understanding individual characteristics that influence the 
effectiveness of management control systems. Without investigating the effect of Dark Triad 
characteristics, the findings related to our first hypothesis would imply that all superiors are 
more lenient when their subordinates face a potential penalty when, in fact, only low Dark Triad 




Information Set for Target Setting 
Past performance for four years: Your line manager achieved the following profit growth in 
the past four years: 
  
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 
Profit Growth 5% 3% 5% 6% 
  
Past peer performance for four years: Your line manager has three peers within the company. 
These individuals achieved the following profit growth in the past: 
  
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 
Peer 1 2% 7% 5% 4% 
Peer 2 8% 6% 5% 5% 
Peer 3 5% 4% 6% 2% 
  
Economic Forecast: For the coming year, the U.S. GDP is expected to grow by 2%. 
Unemployment is expected to be 7% on average. Inflation is expected to increase slightly to 
1.8%. Existing home sales are expected to increase 4%. These statistics are slightly better than 
last year. 
  
Industry Forecast: Retail sales growth is expected to be modest around 5% or less, with profit 
growth of 4% or less. 
  
Swimwear Forecast: Designer swimwear is expected to grow at the same rate as the retail 




Short Dark Triad Scale (SD3) – Jones and Paulhus (2014) 
 
Machiavellianism subscale  
1.  It's not wise to tell your secrets.  
2.  I like to use clever manipulation to get my way. 
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.  
4.  Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.  
5.  It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.  
6.  You should wait for the right time to get back at people.  
7.  There are things you should hide from other people to preserve your reputation.  
8.  Make sure your plans benefit you, not others.  
9.  Most people can be manipulated.  
  
Narcissism subscale  
1.  People see me as a natural leader.  
2.  I hate being the center of attention. (R)  
3.  Many group activities tend to be dull without me.  
4.  I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so.  
5.  I like to get acquainted with important people.  
6.  I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me. (R)  
7.  I have been compared to famous people.  
8.  I am an average person. (R)  
9.  I insist on getting the respect I deserve.  
 
Psychopathy subscale 
1. I like to get revenge on authorities. 
2.  I avoid dangerous situations. (R)  
3.  Payback needs to be quick and nasty.  
4.  People often say I’m out of control.  
5.  It’s true that I can be mean to others.  
6.  People who mess with me always regret it. 
7. I like to pick on losers.14 





*The scales are provided in a random order to participants with the italicized headings removed. 
  
                                                 
14 Two statements were removed from the psychopathy subscale due to their sensitive nature (i.e., legal issues and 
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Frequency of Superiors’ Cumulated Ratings for Each of the Individual Dark Triad Traits and Combined 
 
 
The above charts display the frequency of superiors’ cumulated ratings for each individual Dark Triad trait (i.e., Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy) 
along with cumulated ratings for the combined Dark Triad measure. The numbers on the x-axis represent a range of ratings. Brackets identify that the end 
number is included in the frequency and parentheses identify that the end number is not included in the frequency. These ratings are in response to the Short Dark 





Targets set by Low and High Dark Triad Superiorsi by  
Subordinates' Contract Frame and Choice 
 
Panel A: Targets Set by Low Dark Triad Superiors 
  
 
Panel B: Targets Set by High Dark Triad Superiors  
 
 
i We cumulate the responses to the SD3 and use a median-split to characterize participants as high and low Dark 
Triad superiors. Those at or above the median are classified as high Dark Triad, with those below the median 




























Targets set by Subordinates' Contract Frame and Choice 
 
 












N = 78 
6.58% 
(1.41) 
N = 76 
6.83%  
(1.49) 





N = 87 
6.88% 
(1.67) 
N = 84 
6.87% 
(1.54) 





N = 165 
6.73% 
(1.56) 
N = 160 
6.85% 
(1.52) 
N = 325 
 
 
Panel B: General Linear Model: Effect of ContractFrame and Choice on Targets Set by 
Superiors 
 
IV Prediction Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept  6.70 34.21 0.00 
Contract Frame - -0.57 -2.40 0.01 
Choice  -0.25 -1.09 0.28 
Frame x Choice + 0.61 1.86 0.03 







Bolded p-values are one-tailed. 
 
ContractFrame is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for penalty contract, and 0 for bonus contract. 
Choice is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the subordinate’s choice of contract is salient to 
the superior, and 0 otherwise. 




General Linear Model: 















Bolded p-values are one-tailed. 
 
Contract Frame is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for penalty contract, and 0 for bonus contract. 
Choice is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the subordinate’s choice of contract is salient to 
the superior, and 0 otherwise. 
DarkTriad is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the cumulated score is at or above the median 
(high Dark Triad), and 0 otherwise (low Dark Triad). 
Gender is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if male, and 0 if female. 
 
  
 Coefficient  t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 6.75  24.90 0.00 
Contract Frame -0.87 -2.33 0.01 
Contract Choice -0.14 -0.37 0.71 
Dark Triad -0.41 -1.12 0.27 
Gender 0.67 3.45 <0.01 
Contract Frame × Contract Choice 1.26 2.40 <0.01 
Contract Frame × Dark Triad 0.58 1.10 0.28 
Contract Choice × Dark Triad 0.20 0.39 0.70 




General Linear Model: Effect of ContractFrame and Choice on Targets by Dark Triad 
 
 
Panel A: Low Dark Triad Superiors (below the median, n = 125) 
 
IV Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 6.68 22.24 0.00 
Contract Frame -0.88 -2.25 0.03 
Choice -0.15 -0.39 0.70 
Frame x Choice 1.29 2.33 0.02 







Panel B: High Dark Triad Superiors (at or above the median, n = 131) 
 
IV Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 6.43 21.00 0.00 
Contract Frame -0.26 -0.71 0.48 
Choice 0.06 0.18 0.86 
Frame x Choice 0.03 0.07 0.95 








All p-values are two-tailed. 
 
ContractFrame is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for penalty contract, and 0 for bonus contract. 
Choice is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the subordinate’s choice of contract is salient to 
the superior, and 0 otherwise. 







Simple Effects of Targets Set by Low and High Dark Triad Superiors 
 
Panel A: : Simple Effects for Target for Low Dark Triad (n=125) 
Comparison 
Contrast 
Value t-statistic p-value 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Bonus/Choice -0.21 -0.55 0.59 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Penalty/No Choice 0.86 2.18 0.03 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Penalty/Choice 0.11 0.29 0.78 
Bonus/Choice vs. Penalty/No Choice 1.07 2.70 0.01 
Bonus/Choice vs.  Penalty/Choice 0.32 0.81 0.42 
Penalty/No Choice vs. Penalty/Choice -0.75 -1.82 0.07 
 
 
Panel B: Simple Effects for Target for High Dark Triad (n=131) 
Comparison 
Contrast 
Value t-statistic p-value 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Bonus/Choice 0.14 0.39 0.70 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Penalty/No Choice 0.11 0.30 0.77 
Bonus/No Choice vs. Penalty/Choice -0.08 -0.22 0.83 
Bonus/Choice vs. Penalty/No Choice -0.03 -0.08 0.94 
Bonus/Choice vs.  Penalty/Choice -0.21 -0.63 0.53 








All p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
